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Abstract
This paper extends previous work on the optimal size of government spend-
ing by including nested functional decompositions of military spending into
consumption and investment. Post World War II US data are then used to
estimate nested non-linear growth models using semiparametric methods. As
expected, investment in military and non-military expenditure are both found
to be productive expenditures. Moreover there is little evidence to suggest that
current military spending is having a negative impact on economic growth in
the US, while civilian consumption only tends to have only a weak impact.
This does not imply that society will necessarily benet from a reallocation of
more spending to the military sector, nor that it is the best way to achieve
economic growth. It does suggest that the US economy is not necessarily being
hindered by its current military burden.
keywords:Economic growth; productive state spending; military spending,
semi-parametric estimation
JEL: H50, O41, O47.
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1 Introduction
The economic impact of military spending on economic growth remains an im-
portant and compelling debate, with no clear consensus emerging (Dunne and Uye,
2009; Dunne, 2005; Smith, 2000).While the literature has covered a range of macro-
economic issues there has been little concern over the issues raised in Devarjan et
al (1996) of the impact of government consumption spending and its components
and the possibility of an optimallevel of military spending (in terms of its impact
on economic growth) suggested by nonlinear endogenous growth models. Using US
data for the post World War II period this paper provides just such an analysis.
It takes the (nonlinear) endogenous growth model proposed by Barro (1990) and
develops it to analyse the response of economic growth to changes in the mix of gov-
ernment expenditure and the individual components. The theoretical framework is
developed by assuming the functional components of expenditure (namely, military,
health, infrastructure etc.) and the macro-aggregates consumption and investment
are "productive", while the components of government spending are not "produc-
tive" in nature. Mittnik and Neumann (2003) analyzing the German economy in the
post second world war suggested that a priori assumptions of unproductiveand
productivegovernment spending between consumption and investment may lead to
misleading results, so this paper attempts to investigate these properties empirically
with particular attention to the e¤ect of military spending.
In the empirical literature a major nding is that output growth is negatively
correlated with the share of government consumption in GDP, while is positively
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correlated with the share of government investment 1. Thus, in this paper a disag-
gregated approach is used to evaluate the impact in the economy of the allocation
of government budget between consumption and investment within the functional
components of military and non-military spending. Some basic questions are then
asked: from a scal policy standpoint, how much should the nation spend on military
(and non-military) sector, how should consumption and investment expenditure of
the previous functional categories be allocated within the public sector and what is
(if it exists) the time path that leads to an optimal size allocation?
The key empirical problem is, therefore, to combine the empirical observation
with the theoretical framework by postulating a model that introduces the size of
the functional government expenditures into the Barro (1990) model and examining
how the allocation inuences the results. Devarajan et al. (1996) proposed such an
extension for a specic functional classication of government spending, comparing
the impacts on the growth rate of developed and developing countries. This is fur-
ther developed to focus on the e¤ects of military and non-military components of
government spending, with an even more disaggregated model being developed to
distinguish consumption and investment expenditures with in the functional cate-
gories. In the next section the analytical framework is developed to link the compo-
sition of public spending with economic growth and to determine the nature of the
growth model required to assess the e¤ects of military (or non-military) spending.
Restricted versions of this model, that only consider the consumption and investment
1Aschauer (1989), Barro (1990) were the pioneers that theoretically and empirically highlight
the e¤ects of productive and unproductive government spending.
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categories of government spending are also developed. Section 3 then presents the
empirical analysis using a state-dependent (state-varying) model and providing an
interpretation of the results2. Finally, section 4 presents some conclusions.
2 Conceptual Framework
To develop a theoretical model the existence of a non-monotonic relationship
between growth and government size is assumed and productive government spending
and its components are introduced into an aggregate production function. A baseline
a version of Barro (1990) is used to characterize a number of broad principles with
an optimal government size that maximizes economic growth. Using the constant
elasticity of substitution (CES)3 aggregate production function gives:
(1) y =
h
k  + g 1
i  1

That is commodity production, y, is a function of private capital stock, k, and
aggregate government spending, g1 . For this production function, g1 provides a
unique productive good that is assumed to be a non-perfect substitute for the private
input. The growth equation for private capital needs to be satised:
(2) _k = (1  )
h
k  + g 1
i  1
   c
2See Jones (1995) and ? for an extended analysis of linearity tests in endogenous growth models.
3This functional form is a general theoretical framework. In fact, the CES function includes as
special case the Cobb-Douglas though, with respect to this production function, allows for a larger
degree of substitutability between inputs.
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where _k denotes growth of private capital changes over time,  the at rate income tax
and c the consumption level of households. A representative agent then assumed to
choose consumption, c, and capital, k, to maximize the future instantaneous utilities:
(3) U =
Z
u(c)e t
where  is the rate of time preference and the conventional positive but diminishing
marginal returns to consumption is imposed by the following inequalities:
(4) u0(c)  0; u00(c)  0
As is common in the literature an isoelastic utility function:
(5) u(c) =
c1    1
1  
in which  is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution of consumption. Let  , the
at-rate income tax necessary to nance public sector, be dened as follows:
(6)  =
g1
y
To evaluate the impact of g1 on economic growth, we use the following equality,
which has to be satised at the steady-state:
(7)  =
_c
c
=
1

((1  )y0   )
5
Formally, the model is solved by substituting (5) into (3), and maximizing subject
to (2) giving:
(8)  =
_c
c
=
1

264(1  ) 1=
264

1   1=
(1+)
+  (1+)= 1+
1   1=
1+
375  
375
This gives a standard endogenous growth model in which the dependent variable is a
non-linear function of  and the e¤ect of the public sector depends on the amount of
resources allocated by the government to nance it and by the productivity parameter
of government spending, . That is, the optimal level of the share of government
in GDP occurs at the point where the ate-rate income tax,  , exactly equals the
marginal e¤ect of  Barro (1990), Shieh et al. (2002), Cuaresma and Reitschuler
(2004).
To analyse the military and non-military components of the public budget sec-
tor within this endogenous growth framework, the Devarajan et al. (1996) baseline
model, which accounts for the size of the categories in government spending, pro-
vides a starting point. Central government is assumed to decide the allocation of
expenditure within its components and after that to decide the overall share of total
government spending in GDP. This seems a reasonable assumption for government
behaviour and provides an additive property that enables the marginal e¤ects of
changes in the allocation of government spending to be determined.
In addition, simple manipulation of the government budget constraint gives the
size of the military (and alternatively for non-military) sector that provide the highest
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economic growth. Taking:
(9) g1 = g2 + g3 = y
where g1 and g2 identify the components of government spending for military and
non-military, respectively and  and (1   ) their shares of total expenditure. The
ows of government spending are:
g1 = y(10)
g2 = (1  )y(11)
and combining this with the aggregate production function gives:
(12) y =
h
k  + g 2 + g
 
3
i  1

;
with the modied motion equation for private capital,
(13) _k = (1  )
h
k  + g 1 + g
 
2
i  1
   c
gives the growth rate of consumption (and economic growth rate) which after rear-
ranging is:
(14)  =
1

"
(1  )
 =(        (1  ) )(1+)=
#
The growth equation (14) depends on the at-rate income tax  and on the share
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of resources allocated to each functional component of government spending, main-
taining the non-linearity that is common to this class of endogenous models. Di¤er-
entiating this expression with respect to  (the share of military spending in GDP)
with 0 <  < 1 means that:

(1  ) <



(1 )=
=) d
d
> 0(15)

(1  ) >



(1 )=
=) d
d
< 0(16)
which is consistent with the Devarajan et al. (1996) baseline model and implies
that the impact of the share of military spending on growth depends jointly on the
productivity parameters,  and  relative to their initial share. Thus, if the actual
proportion  is higher than its optimal level with respect to the relative output
elasticity,  and , a negative impact on growth is expected and vice-versa for small
levels of .
Figure 1 compares simulations of the theoretical relationships of the Devarajan et
al. (1996) model to the Barro (1990) model in a nested Cobb-Douglas specication
and shows an inverse hump-shaped path. This implies that there exists an optimal
size of government spending, one that maximizes economic growth. While the growth
rate function reects the specicity of the production and utility functions, with the
maximum depending on the parameter values, it is clear that the non-linearity is a
common feature of these models.
The framework is then extended by assuming that the supply-side channels of
(productive) military spending can give di¤erent outcomes, when the functional
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categories of government consumption and investment are incorporated. Previous
analyses of the economic impact of government spending have generally assumed
(and veried) that public (physical and human) investment represents a productive
component, while consumption expenditure has generally been hypothesized as an
unproductive. This was questioned by Devarajan et al. (1996) who showed that
changes in the composition of government spending towards consumption expendi-
ture may in fact lead to higher steady state growth. In addition, it seems reasonable
to argue that specic components of consumption spending will be productive. In
particular, military spending may have an impact through improving national se-
curity and increases in external threats may well produce increases in the level of
military expenditure and its share of total government spending.
There are also some suggestions in the literature that increased security may
increase economic productivity, through externality e¤ects, and may be a source
of nonlinearity. This is not to say that military spending is more productive than
other forms of expenditure, but it does suggest it is reasonable to consider military
consumption expenditure as potentially productive Dunne and Uye (2009). Exactly
what its impact on private output, productivity and economic growth is, of course,
an empirical issue and one that can be addressed using equation (14). Starting
with the exible Devarajans framework, government spending is allocated to mili-
tary consumption expenditure and a residual category of government spending, i.e.
non-military and military investment spending. The analysis is then repeated us-
ing military investment expenditure, with military consumption and non-military
expenditures comprising the residual category.
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Figure 1: Specication of the endogenous growth models
Notes: graph 1a. adopts:  = 0:02; A1= ;  = 0:75;  = 0:75, graph 1b. adopts:
 = 0:02; A1= ;  = 0:75;  = 0:05;  = 0:20;  = 0:22
3 Empirical Analysis
3.1 Data and Methodological Issues
For the empirical analysis quarterly US data for the period 1958 : 1   2005 : 1
is used to estimate the endogenous growth models. The government consumption
expenditure variable (gov), used in Barros model, is broken up into military (mil)
and civilian spending (nonmil), then these are further disaggregated into consump-
tion and investment. This gives military consumption (milc) and military investment
(mili); non-military consumption (nonmilc) and non-military investment (nonmili).
Output is measured by GDP (at constant and current prices) and gross xed capital
formation is used as a measure for private investment. The main sources are the In-
ternational Financial Statistics (IFS) database, which reports U.S. National Income
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and Product Accounts (NIPA). For estimation, the constant price GDP growth rate
() and the share of the investment in GDP (inv) were computed and tted values
of the investment share computed using an auxiliary regression on lagged investment
growth, to deal with potential endogeneity Jones (1995).
Table 1: Specications of endogenous growth models
Endogenous growth Production function Empirical measures of government
models spending
Barro0s(1990) model y =
h
k  + g 1t
i  1
Total government consumption in GDP
g1t = gov=gdp
Devarajan0s(1996) baseline
model
y =
h
k  + g 2t + R
 
1t
i  1
Share of military spending in GDP
g2t = mil=gdp; R1t = nonmil=gdp
y =
h
k  + g 3t + R
 
2t
i  1
Share of Non-military spending in GDP
g3t = nonmil=gdp; R2t = mil=gdp
Modified benchmark models y =
h
k  + g 4t + R
 
3t
i  1
Share of military consumption in GDP
g4t = milc=gdp; R3t = (nonmil +
mili)=gdp
y =
h
k  + g 5t + R
 
4t
i  1
Share of military investment in GDP
g5t = mili=gdp; R4t = (nonmil +
milc)=gdp
y =
h
k  + g 6t + R
 
5t
i  1
Share of Non-military consump-
tion in GDP g6t = nonmilc=gdp;
R5t = (mil + nonmili)=gdp
y =
h
k  + g 7t + R
 
6t
i  1
Share of Non-military invest-
ment in GDP g7t = nonmili=gdp;
R6t = (mil + nonmilc)=gdp
The specications for the endogenous growth models are presented in Table 1,
together with their corresponding production function and the government spend-
ing variables they include. It is worth noting that disaggregating the government
components of the theoretical model is achieved by using the particular expenditure
component with another residual component, but that both, are modelled to have
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potential productive impact on economic growth.
Figure 2 presents the government spending shares in GDP over time. Panels (c)-
(f), show decreasing trends in the shares of total and military spending, particularly
in the 1960s, while, in contrast, the share of civilian government spending shows
a positive trend initially, tailing o¤ in the late 70s, with a sharp decrease in non-
military public investment. Finally, although military consumption in the U.S.
appears to be event-driven with large cyclical spikes corresponding to wars (or the
threat of war) (Gerace, 2002; Gold, 2005), there is a clear pattern of decline over the
period.
3.2 Econometric specication
In developing the econometric specication, Figure 1 suggests that a good starting
point is to test for the presence of non-linearities in the growth equation. As Mittnik
and Neumann (2003) point out, this avoids specication problems in the linear model
that might result from variations in government size. In line with the simulation
results, the presence of two regimes is assumed, one with low shares of government
spending in GDP and a positive impact of that spending on growth and the other
with high shares and a negative e¤ect. To shed light on the empirical relationships,
the linear model is tested against a smooth transition autoregressive (STAR) model.
This strategy provides objective guidelines for choosing the appropriate (non)linear
model (Cai et al. 2004; Chen, 1993; Tong, 1990; Granger and Teräsvirta, 1993)
and as the STAR belongs to the family of functional autoregressive (FAR) model,
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Figure 2: Time-series plots of GDP growth rate, the share of government spending and
its components in GDP
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these models can be used to estimate the coe¢ cients of the relationship between
government expenditure and economic growth using semi-parametric methods.
Taking a general nonlinear function of the continuous transition variable st gives:
(17) yt = 
0zt + 
0ztG (; c; st) + ut with ut  iid(0; 2)
where zt is a vector of explanatory variables and  = (0; 1::::; m)
0 and  =
(0; 1::::; m) are ((m + 1)x1) parameter vectors of the linear and nonlinear part
of the model, respectively. The transition function G(:) is a bounded function of the
continuous transition variable st, the slope parameter  and the vector of location
parameters, c = (c1; ::::ck). Following Kratzig and Lutkepohl (2004), a sequential
strategy for testing nonlinearity of the function is derived using the logistic smooth
transition (LSTR) model. A third-order Taylor expansion around the hypothesis
 = 0 means the following specications can be identied:
a) asymmetric behaviour in the hypothesized relationship (i.e. one change in the
growth-government spending function, model LSTR(1));
b) a process with heterogeneous dynamic properties between both large and small
values of and central values (model LSTR(2));
c) an Exponential Autoregressive model (EXPAR), an alternative of LSTR(2)
when  is not close to zero Granger and Teräsvirta (1993).
The assumption of additive government expenditure components in the theoret-
ical model means the share of government spending in GDP can be used as the
predetermined transition variable. Methodologically, this implies distinguishing be-
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tween two di¤erent cases depending on the inclusion or exclusion of the transition
variable from zt . When the nonlinear relationship uses total government spending
(Barros model in Table 1), the transition variable is incorporated in zt, giving the
auxiliary regression:
(18) yt = 
0
0zt +
3X
j=1
0j~zts
j
t + u

t
where the parameterization yields a vector zt = (1; ~zt), in which ~zt is a (mx1), and
ut = ut + R3(; c; st)
0zt where the remainder is R3(; c; st). For the other growth
model specications the size of the total government spending in GDP transition
variable is not an element of zt and the empirical specication is given as:
(19) yt = 
0
0zt +
3X
j=1
0jzts
j
t + u

t
The null hypothesis of linearity 1 = 2 = 3 = 0 is then tested against the alterna-
tive hypotheses shown in Table 2 using the strategy described above. The nonlinear
model yields one choice among the available nonlinear specications, however, so
discriminating between the models is based on the strength of rejection, as measured
by the p-value. If the test gives the strongest rejection the e¢ cient nonlinear models
have to be LSTR(2) or EXPAR specications, while if the p-value is greater than
the usual 5% or 10% the LSTR(1) model is accepted.
Under the maintained nonlinear hypothesis of a model with one transition vari-
able and one regime change, a dynamic model can be estimated by dening zt as
a vector that includes the lagged values (p) of the endogenous and exogenous vari-
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Table 2: Summary of hypothesis test.
H01 : 1 = 2 = 3 = 0 Linear model selection.
H02 : 1 = 0j2 = 3 = 0 LSTR(1) with one transition variable and one regime change.
H03 : 1 = 0j2 = 0 LSTR(2) with one transition variable and two regime changes.
H04 : 3 = 0 EXPAR where transition states are more than two.
ables:
zt =
 
1; t h; invt; git h; Rjt h

with t h the lagged GDP growth rates, invt the tted share of private investment
in GDP, git h the share of productive government spending in GDP and Rjt h the
residual component:
t = a0 + a1t 1 + :::::+ apt p + d1invt + b1git 1(g1t)
+ :::::+ bpgit p(g1t) + c1Rjt 1(git) + ::::::::+ cpRjt p(git)
(20)
It is worth noting that this is an extension of an AR model, where the coe¢ cients
vary according to the transition variable g1t. The structure of (18) allows the long
run e¤ects of a change in total government expenditure, or a specic component,
to be estimated using a recursive algorithm. The state dependent coe¢ cients in
(18) are estimated using semi-parametric moving window least squares (MWLS), a
procedure that optimizes the window length (w) and reduces small sample statistical
problems (Granger and Teräsvirta, 1993). Extending the endogenous growth model
proposed by Jones (1995), ?, Mittnik and Neumann (2003), means that a measure
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of the long-run impact of public spending on growth can be obtained by summing
the coe¢ cients of the nonlinear model4 .
3.3 Estimation and tests
Rejecting the hypothesis of non-stationary is a necessary condition for testing
a linear endogenous growth model against a non-linear specication (Kratzig and
Lutkepohl, 2004), so before estimating the models the time series properties of the
growth equation variables are investigated using unit root tests. However, in the case
of non-linear time series, the conventional unit root tests only represent necessary, not
su¢ cient, conditions for stationary 5. It is also worth noting that the generally low
power of these tests becomes practically nil for variables constrained to lie between
zero and one.
Appendix 1 reports the results of augmented Dickey and Fuller tests for the
variables in the endogenous growth model. Using exible specications, the only
variable that does not reject non-stationary at the usual signicance level is the
share of private investment in GDP. Private investment (inv) is the most volatile
component so, following Mittnik and Neumann (2003), the growth rate of investment
is included in the model to account for the cyclical uctuations. While the test value
4Algebrically: LR(git 1 = b=1  a), where b =
Pp
l=1 bl is the sum of the coe¢ cients relative to
lagged values of the endogenous variable and a =
Pp
l=1 al is the sum of the coe¢ cients relative to
lagged values of a share of government spending, while (git 1) is the assumed state variable.
5It is necessary to introduce supplementary requirements for a (complete) stationary of time
series in nonlinear model: a) the generating mechanism is time invariant for each nite sub-sample
of the time-series; b) the time series have a short-memory (Granger and Teräsvirta, 1993).
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for share of the total government spending exceeds the 5% signicance level, it is
not above 10% one, rejecting the hypothesis of non stationarity for this variable
is justied. Having established stationarity, the strategy described in section 3 is
used to investigate the non-linearity properties of the seven di¤erent specications.
Choosing a lag length of 4 periods for both the endogenous and exogenous variables
in equation (18), gave the results in Table 3. In line with theoretical expectations,
there is a strong evidence for the presence of non-linearity. Indeed, the null hypothesis
of linearity (H01 hypothesis) can be rejected in favour of the alternative hypothesis
for every specication. Within the group of non-linear specications, the LSTR(1)
specication is always selected , as linearity is rejected most strongly for this form
of non-linear model (H02 hypothesis).
Starting with the rst model in Table 1 (Barros model) each model is estimated
using the state-varying parameter method described above, maintaining the same
window length (w = 80) and lag lengths (p = 4 ). Anticipating that this might not
be enough for models for military consumption and investment, the window length
is extended ( w = 120). In fact, though the results (estimations and tests) are
generally robust to di¤erent window lengths, when the the e¤ects of the components
of expenditure on economic growth are considered, the greater variability in the data
may be better handled (smoothed) by an increased window length (Granger and
Teräsvirta, 1993).
The U.S. estimation results for the Barro model are plotted in Figure 3, which
shows the overall long run e¤ect of changes in government spending on GDP (y axis)
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Table 3: Non-linearity F-tests for model specication (p  values).
Specications of government components in
the endogenous growth model
H01 H04 H03 H02
Share of total government spending in GDP 7:38e  44 0:61 0:79 1:04e 52
Share of military spending in GDP 1:60e  36 0:86 0:75 4:69e 45
Share of non-military spending in GDP ** 1:60e  36 0:86 0:75 4:69e 45
Share of military consumption in GDP 2:17e  31 0:88 0:97 6:80e 41
Share of military investment in GDP 3:21e  37 0:86 0:41 2:87e 45
Share of non-military consumption in GDP 1:40e  33 0:23 0:067 1:04e 38
Share of non-military investment in GDP 1:44e  37 0:97 0:76 1:58e 46
Note: In this Table are reported the p-values of F-sequential non-linear tests. The asterisks () show that the
linearity hypothesis tests are not rejected at the 5% level. The suggested models are coherent with one transition
variable and one regimeÕs change LSTR(1), as specied in the Table2.  Coherently with the non-linear models of
the Table1, we report the values of the specication where the government component is the share of non-military
spending in GDP. Because we use as transition variable the share of total government, the addictive condition with
the share of military spending in GDP determines the same F   test results of the model2.
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against the average of the state variable git at time t 1, that isM(git) =
Ps+w 1
v=s xiv
with s = 1; ::::T  w. This shows the shape of the relationship to be consistent with
the theory. To obtain the graphs below we will follow the same procedure.
Figure 3: Long-run e¤ects implied by Barros (1990) model.
These results suggest an optimal size for total government spending in the US
of around 0:205-0:21 of GDP, with a non-linear response when this share of GDP
is exceeded. It seems clear from Figure 2(b) that an excessive share of government
spending in the period up to the rst oil shock generated a negative relationship
between government spending and economic growth, which then changed to a positive
one, with the magnitude of the subsequent decrease in the share su¢ ciently large for
the relationship to be positive overall. As expected, when government spending is
broken down into military and non-military components, in line with Devarajan et
al. (1996)s baseline model, the di¤erent components of expenditure have di¤ering
e¤ects on the long run growth of the U.S. economy. Thus the individual components
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of government spending need not exhibit persistent e¤ects on economic growth even
if aggregate public expenditure does. (Jones, 1995).
Figure 4: Long-run e¤ects implied by the Deverajans (1996) baseline model
The share of military spending in GDP, gives a hump backed shape similar to
that for total government spending, suggesting that the long run e¤ect of military
spending increases up to around 0:065 of GDP and declines after that, though from
the graph the share of military spending does appear to be event-driven. In Figure
2, the long run pattern showed a clear trend decline, though with some movement,
while Figure 4 suggests that there was a break point at the beginning of the 1970s,
with the slope of the growth rate function changing from negative to positive.
This calls into question the implicit prediction that the a re-allocation of the share
of civilian expenditure would signicantly a¤ect growth rates (Ramey and Shapiro,
1999). On the other hand, Figure 4b reveals that civilian spending may be classied
as an unproductive component of government expenditure though on careful inspec-
tion the graph may also suggest a slight positive and constant e¤ect with a cluster of
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observations being the high share of non-miltary spending and high e¤ects. To con-
sider whether military (and non military) components can be classied as productive
or not, Figure 5 presents the long run e¤ects of the estimated modied benchmark
models. Figures 5a and 5b show the patterns of military consumption and investment
to be in line with the predictions of the endogenous growth models. In both cases,
signicant non-linearities are found with an optimal size around 0:055   0:06 and
0:01 for consumption and investment, respectively. However, di¤erent explanations
are proposed for justifying the magnitude of the optimal size of expenditure.
The observation of high substitution e¤ects of military spending in investment
a¤ects the results in two ways. Firstly, the decline of this functional component pro-
duced a transitory rise in non-military investment that did not generate a long run
optimal growth rate because simultaneously the U.S. economy experienced a reduc-
tion of overall government spending on investment. This implies that the amount of
public non-military investment was below its optimum value, as shown by the exis-
tence of a monotonic increasing relationship between this component of expenditure
and the GDP growth rate. Secondly, the re-allocative e¤ects in investment for each
functional category of government expenditure, has been sustained by the strong
increases in expenditure on Medical care, which seems to have generated a short run
stimulus for private investment with a limited retroactive e¤ect on public investment
(Pieroni, 2008). On the other hand, the pattern of military consumption expenditure
is likely to have increased its marginal productivity, linked with a sharp rise of the
demand for security from U.S. citizens, so that a positive impact on economic growth
is not surprising, independent of the share of military spending in GDP.
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The hypothesis of a non-linear relationship is not supported for the relationship
between non-military consumption and economic growth, suggesting this component
does not represent a good proxy for productive public spending. This result is in
line with cross-country empirical analyses by Devarajan et al. (1996) and Kneller et
al. (1999) indicates that industrialized countries have generally been misallocating
public spending by favouring public consumption over public investment.
Figure 5: Long-run e¤ects implied by the modied model
23
4 Concluding remarks
The e¤ect of military spending on economic growth has been the subject of con-
siderable debate, wit the declines that took place at the end of the Cold War and
the present day pressures to increase expenditures. Within this research there is
very little work that considers the changes in military burden within the context
of the composition of overall government spending. The results for the post war
US economy show clear di¤erences in the impact of the di¤erent components of
government spending and support the ndings of Devarajan et al. (1996) that the
classication of government current expenditure as unproductive and investment ex-
penditures as productive is not necessarily adequate. Specically, the results show
that including categories of military and non-military spending in an endogenous
growth model leads to the conclusion that military spending is productive, while
non-military component does not signicantly e¤ect economic growth. While for
military spending we nd evidence of the hump-shaped models for consumption and
investment found for total expenditure, current non-military government expendi-
ture does not signicantly a¤ect economic growth. This suggests that the past bias
in favour of investment expenditures for growth may indeed be misplaced.
These ndings suggest that for the US economy and in the context of an en-
dogenous growth model military consumption and investment can play a productive
role in the economy. This does not mean that society will necessarily benet from
reallocation to military spending as government spending has many goals in society
and economy. Nor does it mean that military spending is the best way to achieve
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economic growth. It does suggest, however, that the US economy is not necessarily
being hindered by its current military burden, but that further increases are likely
to be at the cost of economic growth in the long run.
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Appendix A: Dickey-Fuller test
Table 4: Dickey-Fuller Test
Variable Test statistics P   value
g -4.517 0.0002
inv -1.587 0.4900
g -1.739 0.0910
g1 -2.631 0.0046
g2 -3.068 0.0290
g3 -2.465 0.0073
g4 -1.846 0.0332
g5 -3.203 0.0198
g6 -1.691 0.0462
notes: The results are obtained with optimal lags and with or without presence of deterministic trends.
Their robustness is then checked by Dickey-Fuller GLS test.
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